Retis-Risk is a comprehensive framework recently developed for the assessment and management of the seismic resilience of interurban roadway networks. In this paper, this framework is applied for the road network of the prefecture of Western Macedonia in Greece. Refined data concerning real traffic conditions and network topology were collected and a detailed network mapping was performed in GIS. Utilizing an ad-hoc developed software for implementing the holistic methodology, the as-built road network was assessed and the network components with the highest vulnerability and consequence were identified. To improve the loss assessment reliability, bridge-specific fragility curves were employed based on the refined FE modeling. Structural and traffic cost due to earthquake scenarios of different return period were then predicted. To identify effective loss mitigation measures, the whole process was repeated assuming two different pre-earthquake risk management strategies. The first one concerns a retrofit program tailored to selected (i.e., the most critical) network components, while the second one focuses on the beneficial effect of a better recovery planning. Results indicate the significant contribution of an effective risk management to the loss mitigation and network resilience improvement. Moreover, a sustainable health monitoring system was installed on Polymylos bridge to ensure satellite data transmission during an earthquake event to update the postearthquake recovery model, nearly in real time, with the measured spectral acceleration of the superstructure. The results indicate that the road network is adequately resilient, primarily due to its newly constructed infrastructure and its compliance to modern seismic standards. However, it consists an interesting application case demonstrating the applicability of the methodology and the major potential benefits of a holistic resilience-based management for the case similar intercity highway networks.
INTRODUCTION
Recent strong earthquake events, including Chile 2010 and Tohoku 2011, among others, have shown that road network damage and traffic disruptions may substantially impair emergency response, rescue and recovery [1] , [2] . At the same time, several cases have been reported wherein even minor damage to key network components had a disproportionally significant impact to the total amount of earthquake-induced loss. These facts have clearly shown that a significant part of the loss incurred by the community could have been averted should appropriate risk mitigation strategies had been adopted before the occurrence of the earthquake.
Since reducing exposure to seismic hazard by reallocating structures is practically impossible for roadway networks that span over a wide area, emphasis should be placed on minimizing the potential earthquake consequences on the economy and society. An efficient planning for mitigating seismic risk of road networks [3] - [5] should involve a broad, system-perspective consideration that takes into account functionality and services rather than conventionally analyzing the structural performance of individual network components, such as bridges, tunnels and slopes. Moreover, the recovery process should be incorporated into the risk assessment, since it greatly influences the total amount of losses incurred.
Retis-Risk (www.retis-risk.eu) is a holistic framework developed for the seismic risk assessment and resilience enhancement of interurban roadway networks [6] . Utilizing a software tailored to the developed methodology, this paper describes its application of the for the case of the interurban roadway network of the Western Macedonia prefecture, in Greece. To illustrate the importance of post-disaster planning, two risk management strategies are considered and comparatively assessed; the first based on the identification and retrofit of the key components with the highest impact to network resilience and a second one, solely focusing on the improvement of recovery planning.
The study is bases on the actual data concerning network topology and traffic conditions which were collected and processed. Network bridge fragilities were taken into account in a refined manner utilizing a novel bridge-specific fragility methodology [7] . Tunnel fragility was also considered in the analysis, in an approximate manner through the description of a general tunnel fragility class [8] .
Results indicate that the "as-built" road network is adequately resilient, primarily due to its newly constructed infrastructure and its compliance to modern seismic standards. However, the analysis of the two risk management strategies reveals the importance of quantifying resilience and then assessing alternative means to enhance loss mitigation and operation recovery. This study also demonstrates the applicability of the methodology as a whole in spotting key network components with the highest contribution to resilience, a process that is key in identifying the retrofit schemes with the maximum positive impact. Finally, the applicability of the methodology is further demonstrated by installing of a, satellite-based, monitoring system to a major bridge to provide nearly real-time post-earthquake spectral and free-field accelerations that can update the intensity measure distribution estimates after an earthquake event [9] . A summary of the methodology, the description of the network, the alternative enhancement strategies, as well as sample resilience assessment results are presented in the following.
ROAD NETWORK DESCRIPTION

Network Topology
"Εγνατία Οδός", often translated as Via Egnatia with code A2, extends from the western port of Igoumenitsa to the eastern Greek-Turkish border running a total of 670 km (420 mi). Egnatia Highway crosses the prefecture West Macedonia consisting the backbone of its road network, which is also complemented by several secondary roads that serve to the regional transportation needs (Fig. 1) . Both the main highway of the region under study and the secondary road system with speed limits lower than 90km/h are modelled with a total number of 263 bidirectional links and 283 traffic nodes for the purposes of this analysis. 
Key components of the network system
The set of key network components, that is, the structures whose failure may lead to road closures, is the first to be identified. Key components are assumed to be the bridges, overpasses, slopes and tunnels across the network. Given the structure of the interurban system studied, bridges and tunnels exist along the Egnatia highway only. Overpasses of the secondary network are also neglected for simplicity given their smaller size, simpler structural systems and minor effect to the overall network resilience. However, in principle, their vulnerability can be accounted for both by the methodology and the software developed, which are structure, size and importanceindependent.
The key components locations were visually identified through Google Earth while their structural and geometrical characteristics were provided by Egnatia Highway S.A. A total number of 148 key components were identified within the network system studied. Since the traffic along each network link is bi-directional, each identified key component comprises of two identical branches with a unique ID number per pair. 
Pre-earthquake traffic conditions
An Origin-Destination (OD) matrix is used to describe the travel demands in the network for all possible combinations, extracted from a relevant study carried out by the stakeholder. Given the travel demands and the additional input of the traffic capacity of every network link, pre-earthquake traffic flows over the whole network are calculated according to [10] . It is noted that the OD matrix used herein, refers to travel demands during the typical hour of a normal day and thus appropriate scaling factors are applied to the results whenever daily traffic data are deemed.
Structural stock value, repair cost ratio, "traffic capacity-time" relationship
A re-construction cost was calculated for each one of the 74 dual branch key components assuming a value of 17.000€/m for the (twin) bridges and overpasses and 20.000€/m for the tunnels. Based on the length of each component, the total structural stock value of the network portfolio is approximately assessed to 630 million euros. Moreover, a damage state-specific repair cost ratio was defined for all the key components according to [11] assuming ratios of 0.03, 0.25, 0.75 and 1 for Damage State 1 (DS1) to Damage State 4 (DS4), respectively. A closure period of 0, 7, 150 and 450 days is further assigned to the four damage states, DS1 to DS4, for all key network components, assuming that after this period 100% of the traffic carrying capacity is regained.
SEISMIC HAZARD ANALYSIS
The integration of seismicity from different earthquake sources that is expressed in the form of conventional seismic hazard maps, is not applicable for the case of the post-earthquake traffic distribution, as the latter depends on the individual probability of operation of each network key component, which is in turn dependent on the specific seismic scenario examined and the corresponding spatial distribution of the Intensity Measures (IM) of interest [12] , [13] . For this reason, hazard is herein assessed independently for each one of the m seismic sources potentially affecting the network and for a set of n different return periods.
Along these lines, eleven seismic sources (m=11) were identified, located either within the case study area or in its vicinity. These are named according to the seismic faults and the closest cities and towns as {"Kozani", "Kastoria", "Arta", "Ioannina", "Paramythia", "Anthemounta", "Larissa", "Edessa", "Koritsa", "Agrafa", "Stivos"}. For every fault, ground motion maps associated with the k=4 return periods, namely 100, 475, 980 and 1890 years, were generated leading to a sample of kxm maps depicting the spatial distribution of intensity. 
FRAGILITY ANALYSIS
For every bridge and overpass key component of this study, a set of four fragility curves was generated for the four damage states considered, DS1 to DS4, corresponding to minor, moderate, extensive damage and collapse, respectively (Fig.  4) . Bridges and overpasses are organized in classes of identical fragility, while for important bridges of the network a bridge-specific methodology is followed [7] involving nonlinear static and incremental dynamic response history analysis. The stock of the 28 twin tunnels of the network was grouped into one gross tunnel fragility class also illustrated in Fig. 4 based on fragility relationships expressed in terms of peak ground velocity [8] . Figure 4 : Bridge-specific fragility curves: bridges b1, b2 and b3 (charts a-c). General tunnel-class fragility curves (chart d)
PGA (g)
In order to be consistent with the PGA-based maps developed, a transformation of PGV to PGA was performed according to [14] . Given the PGA value at the location of the key components, the probability that each component will experience damage corresponding to Damage States 1 to 4 was derived as follows: 
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
Having generated 11 different seismic maps for each return period, a corresponding set of traffic scenarios is then developed, under the assumption that immediately after an earthquake a key network component may either retain the 100% of its traffic carrying capacity (i.e., remain intact and hence, fully operational) or close and completely lose its traffic carrying capacity. Along these lines, each one of the 74 key components is assumed with a binary response, associated to a value of either 1 (fully functional) or 0 (closed) based on whether the damage induced exceeds a critical, moderate level of damage (DS cr =DS 2 ). Given the individual Damage State probabilities computed by eq. (1), a Monte Carlo (MC) analysis is employed and 10 initial traffic scenario samples, each one consisting of a scheme defining open and closed network links, are associated to every PGA map. Hence, a group of 11x10=110 initial traffic scenarios is generated for each one of the four earthquake return periods. Every initial traffic scenario is then decomposed to several phases that evolve in time based on the stepwise opening of the key components throughout the recovery period as shown in Figures 6 and 7 . The latter decomposition of the initial (immediately after the earthquake) traffic scenario to P=10 distinct post-earthquake phases is based on the "traffic carrying capacity vs. time" assumptions described in section 2.4. 
SEISMIC RISK ASSESMENT OF THE "AS-BUILT" NETWORK
The total cost associated with each earthquake event k (k taking values from 1 to 4 for the 100, 475, 980 and 1890 years return period), is the sum of the cumulative direct cost of structural damage within the network and the indirect, earthquakeinduced total traffic cost. Based on the repair cost ratios defined in Section 2.4 and the probability of attaining every damage state, the Estimated Structural Cost ESC k,m due to earthquake k stemming from source m is derived for the i=74 key network components as:
where:
, , , Subsequently, the estimated traffic cost (ETC) can be associated to every seismic map, as the mean of the costs calculated for the 10 Monte Carlo samples (i.e., each one for each phase) simulated from that map: Τhe maximum of the estimated structural and traffic cost out of the 11 cases of individual seismic sources leads to the envelope total network cost (TNC k ) and identifies the critical seismic source that has the higher contribution to the overall loss among equiprobable possible costs corresponding to the 11 seismic sources:
In the present case study, seismic source "Kozani" turn out to be the critical one among for all m=11 sources leading to a total network cost of TNC k equal to 8.0, 24.6, 29.0, 33.6 million euros for return periods 100, 475, 980 and 1890 years respectively, (Fig. 8) . It is worth mentioning that these values are very low (i.e., less than 5%) with respect to the total structural stock value of the network which was estimated to 630 million euros, thus implying that the network is considerably resilient to earthquakes. This is of course anticipated given the newly constructed and seismically designed Egnatial Highway key components. Moreover, traffic cost is low compared to the structural cost for all the return periods examined. This is because the probabilities of experiencing damage corresponding to DS3 and DS4 that lead to road closure and hence, to additional traffic cost are much lower than the probabilities of DS1 and DS2 (Fig. 5 ) that contribute only to the structural cost. 
RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
For every Monte Carlo-sampled initial traffic scenario that is decomposed into phases, a plot showing network functionality evolution throughout the recovery period is generated. Every vertical branch of such a plot is associated to the opening of one or more links and respectively to one or more critical key components that are the last link components to open for the traffic (i.e. components that define the opening time of the whole link in case of a series of components comprising a link). Figure 9 shows the critical key components for the phases included in two indicative Monte Carlo samples. The highly-rated critical key components, which are the components that are more frequently associated to vertical branches and influence at a greater extent the recovery of the network, have the higher impact to network resilience. Given the critical key components for all the phases throughout a properly defined pool of functionality plots, a retrofit scheme targeting the specific highly-rated critical key components for that pool can be defined. In this study, the pool of the 10 functionality plots associated to the 10 Monte Carlo samples sampled from the 1890 years return period event of the critical seismic source "Kozani, is used to define the retrofit plan. Key components b15, b18, b20, b21, b26 and b30 (Table 1) A retrofit scheme therefore is developed for the particular bridges leading to updated fragilities or reduced probability of failure for the same Intensity Measure (Fig. 10) . The updated fragilities were in this case approximately derived by multiplying the mean threshold value of the corresponding "as-built" components by 1.3, for all DSs. A second risk management strategy consisting of improved post-earthquake response expressed through an improved traffic carrying capacity-time relationship was also considered. In this case, closure periods were assumed to be lower due to better recovery planning and were updated to 0, 4, 100 and 300 days instead of 0, 7, 150 and 450 days for Damage States 1 to 4, respectively. Figure 11 depicts the resulting estimated structural, traffic and total cost for different earthquake return periods for the case of the "as-built" network as well as the two risk management strategies (i.e., bridge retrofit or improved recovery planning) due to the seismic maps derived from the critical seismic source, as identified in Section 6.
Retrofit of selected key components is found to be more effective compared to the recovery plan enhancement for all the examined return periods. This is because, in this particular network, structural cost, which is essentially unaffected by an improved recovery, is the much higher than traffic cost. However, both risk management strategies contribute to a non-negligible, yet small (5-18%), extent to the the estimated total network cost reduction again due to the high resilience and low expected loss of the "as-built" network. 
STUCTURAL HEALTH MONITORING OF G9 BRIDGE
To further explore the possibility to update the intensity measure estimates with actual recordings after a major seismic event, a resilient structural health monitoring (SHM) scheme was installed to G9 bridge of the Egnatia motorway (b40 in Table 1 ) [9] . The system is based on serial/optical fiber data transfer from the data loggers to a local communication center, hybrid wired/cellular/satellite gateways from the local center to the end user, and uninterruptable power supply unit-based back up energy sources. The innovative elements this installation are the redundant end user gateways and the use of satellite communication that can provide crucial independence from terrestrial telecommunication networks. Nearly real-time data transmission can significantly improve the prediction of potentially damaged network components and optimize the recovery actions of the first few hours. This pilot instrumentation is deemed a useful demonstration of the potential towards real-time estimation of seismic risk. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper an application is presented of the Retis-Risk framework (www.retisrisk.eu) for the case of the road network of Western Macedonia prefecture in Greece. After defining the network topology and pre-earthquake traffic conditions vulnerability of bridges and overpasses were taken into account in a refined way through the use of bridge-specific fragility curves. Tunnel fragility was also accounted for in the form of a general fragility class. The structural and traffic cost due to earthquakes of certain return periods was assessed for the existing network of the specific prefecture. The resilience of the network was found to be considerable mainly due to the recent construction of the high standard Egnatia Highway. For demonstration purposes, two alternative risk management strategies were also examined involving both a tailored retrofit scheme and an improved recovery planning strategy, the first being more effective by reducing loss by approximately up to 18%. This pilot study is deemed a useful example of the applicability of the RetisRisk framework in assessing the seismic risk of interurban networks that can significantly enhance the informed decision-making of stakeholders, particularly of networks with a number of sub-standard key components and a more complex structure of interconnected roads.
